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Introduction
The 20 th century witnessed the development and refinement of the mathematical notion of infinity. Here of course I am referring primarily to the development of Set Theory which is that area of modern mathematics devoted to the study of infinity. This development raises an obvious question: Is there a non-physical realm of infinity?
As is customary in modern Set Theory, V denotes the universe of sets. The purpose of this notation is to facilitate the (mathematical) discussion of Set Theory-it does not presuppose any meaning to the concept of the universe of sets.
The basic properties of V are specified by the ZFC axioms. These axioms allow one to infer the existence of a rich collection of sets, a collection which is complex enough to support all of modern mathematics (and this according to some is the only point of the conception of the universe of sets).
I shall assume familiarity with elementary aspects of Set Theory. The ordinals calibrate V through the definition of the cumulative hierarchy of sets, [17] . The relevant definition is given below. Definition 1. Define for each ordinal α a set V α by induction on α.
(1) V 0 = ∅.
(2) V α+1 = P(V α ) = {X | X ⊆ V α }. There is a much more specific version of the question raised above concerning the existence of a non-physical realm of infinity: Is the universe of sets a non-physical realm? It is this latter question that I shall focus on.
There are a number of serious challenges to the claim that the answer is yes. But where do these issues arise? More precisely for which ordinals α is the conception of
The first point that I wish to make is that for a rather specific finite value of n, the claim that V n exists is a falsifiable claim and moreover that this "possibility" is consistent with our collective (formal) experience in Mathematics to date. The details are the subject of the next section and this account is a variation of that given in [12] . I will continue the narative bringing in the basic arguments of [13] and [15] , ultimately defining a position on mathematical truth which is the collective conclusion of these three papers.
The realm of the finite
By Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem any system of axioms of reasonable expressive power is subject to the possibility of inconsistency, including of course the axioms for number theory. A natural question is how profound an effect could an inconsistency have on our view of mathematics or indeed on our view of physics.
For each finite integer n, |V n+1 | = 2 |V n | and so even for relatively small values of n, V n is quite large. Is the conception of V 1000 meaningful? What about the conception of V n where n = |V 1000 |?
By a routine Gödel sentence construction I produce a formula in the language of set theory which implicitly defines a property for finite sequences of length at most 10 24 . For a given sequence this property is easily decided; if s is a sequence with this property then s is a sequence of non-negative integers each less than 10 24 and the verification can be completed (with appropriate inputs) in significantly fewer than 10 48 steps.
If there exists a sequence with this property then the conception of V n is meaningless where n = |V 1000 |. I use the bound 10 24 in part because the verification that
This statement concerns only V ω (i.e., the realm of Number Theory) and yet its truth has implications for the nonexistence of the universe of sets, again a vastly larger realm.
The philosophical consequences of the existence of a sequence of length 10 24 as described above, are clearly profound for it would demonstrate the necessity of the finiteness of the universe. Clearly such a sequence does not exist. However this property has the feature that if arbitrarily large sets do exist then there is no proof of length less than 10 24 that no such sequence of length at most 10 24 can have this property. I
shall make these claims more precise.
Is the existence of such a sequence a meaningful question for our actual physical universe? A consequence of quantum mechanics (as opposed to classical mechanics)
is that one could really build (on Earth, today) a device with a nonzero (though ridiculously small) chance of finding such a sequence if such a sequence exists, which is the other reason for the explicit bound of 10 24 . So the claim that no such sequence exists is a prediction about our world.
Now the claim that there is no such sequence is analogous to the claim that there is no formal contradiction in Set Theory or in Set Theory together with large cardinal axioms. I do not see any credible argument at present for the former claim other than the claim that the conception of V n is meaningful where n = |V 1000 | (though in 2 10 26 years there will be such a credible argument). But then what can possibly provide the basis for the latter claim other than some version of the belief that the conception of the universe of sets is also meaningful?
Preliminaries
I shall assume familiarity with set theory at a naive level and below list informally the axioms. I do this because I will need a variation of this system of axioms and this variation is not a standard one.
Axiom 0 There exists a set. Axiom 3 (Union) If A is a set then there exists a set C whose elements are the elements of the elements of A.
Axiom 1 (Extensionality)
Two
Axiom 4 (Powerset) If
A is a set then there exists a set C whose elements are the subsets of A.
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Axiom 5 (Regularity or Foundation) If A is a set then either A is empty (i. e. A has no elements) or there exists an element C of A which is disjoint from A.
Axiom 6 (Comprehension)
If A is a set and P(x) formalizes a property of sets then there exists a set C whose elements are the elements of A with this property.
Axiom 7 (Axiom of Choice) If A is a set whose elements are pairwise disjoint and each nonempty then there exists a set C which contains exactly one element from each element of A.
Axiom 8 (Replacement)
If A is a set and P(x) formalizes a property which defines a function of sets then there exists a set C which contains as elements all the values of this function acting on the elements of A.
Axiom 9 (Infinity) There exists a set W which is nonempty and such that for each element A of W there exists an element B of W such that A is an element of B.
I make some remarks. Axiom 6 and Axiom 8 are really infinite lists or schemata corresponding to the possibilities of the acceptable properties. These axioms are vague in that it may not be clear what an acceptable property is. Intuitively these properties are those that can be expressed using only the fundamental relationships of equality and set membership and is made mathematically precise through the use of formal mathematical logic.
Axioms 0-8 are (essentially) a reformulation of the axioms of number theory. It is the Axiom of Infinity that takes one from number theory to set theory. An exact reformulation of the number theory is given by Axioms 0-8 together the negation of Axiom 9. Mathematical constructions specify objects in the universe of sets, this is the informal point of view I shall adopt. For example by using a property that cannot be true for any set, x x, one can easily show using Axiom 0 and Axiom 4 that there exists a set with no elements. By Axiom 1 this set is unique, it is the emptyset and is denoted by ∅.
Finite Set Theory
The formal versions of the axioms on page 3 are the ZFC axioms which is a specific (infinite) theory in the formal first order language for Set Theory-a specific list is given in [12] for the formal language, L(=,∈), of Set Theory. This theory is too strong for my purposes. The following axioms describe the universe of sets under the assumption that for some finite ordinal α, V = V α+1 .
Axiom 0 There exists a set.
Axiom 1 (Extensionality) Two sets A and B are equal if and only if they have the same elements.
Axiom 2 (Bounding) There exists a set C such that every set is a subset of C.
Axiom 3 (Union) If
A is a set then there exists a set C whose elements are the elements of the elements of A.
Axiom (4a) (Powerset) For all sets A either there exists a set B whose elements are all the subsets of A, or there exists a set C such that every set is a subset of C and such that A is not an element of C.
Axiom (4b) (Powerset) For all sets A, either every set is a subset of A, or there exists a set B such that B is an element of A and such that A does not contain all the subsets of B, or there is a set C whose elements are all the subsets of A.
Axiom 5 (Regularity) If A is a set then either A is empty or there exists an element C of A which is disjoint from A.
Axiom 6 (Comprehension)
Axiom 7 (Axiom of Finiteness) If A is a nonempty set then there is an element B of
A such that for all sets C, if C is an element of A then B is not an element of C.
The two forms of the Powerset Axiom are needed to compensate for the lack of the Pairing Axiom and the Bounding Axiom eliminates the need for the Axiom of Replacement. Note that the set specified by the Bounding Axiom must be unique (by the Axiom of Extensionality). Axiom 1-Axiom 6 imply that for some ordinal α, V = V α+1 . By Axiom 7, this ordinal is finite and so these axioms actually do imply the assertion, "For some finite ordinal α, V = V α+1 ". As a consequence one can show that these axioms also imply the Axiom of Choice.
The formal versions of these axioms above define the theory with which I shall be working, it is our base theory and I denote it by ZFC 0 .
The formula
I first discuss the standard example of a Gödel sentence modified to our context (in the language L(=,∈) and relative to the theory ZFC 0 ). This is the sentence, Ξ 0 , which asserts that its negation, (¬Ξ 0 ), can be proved from the theory ZFC 0 .
By the usual arguments it follows (within our universe of sets) that the theory ZFC 0 does not prove Ξ 0 and ZFC 0 does not prove (¬Ξ 0 ); i. e. the sentence Ξ 0 is independent of the theory ZFC 0 . I give the argument. Then for all sufficiently large finite ordinals, n,
and so for all sufficiently large finite ordinals, n, (V n , ∈) Ξ 0 . But for all finite ordinals n > 0, (V n , ∈) ZFC 0 , and so for all finite ordinals n > 0,
which is a contradiction.
The sentence Ξ 0 is too pathological even for my purposes, a proof of (¬Ξ 0 ) cannot belong to a model of ZFC 0 with any extent beyond the proof itself. The sentence I seek is obtained by a simple modification of Ξ 0 which yields the sentence, Ξ.
Informally, the sentence Ξ asserts that there is a proof from ZFC 0 of (¬Ξ) of length less than 10 24 and further that V n exists where n = |V 1000 |. As I have already indicated, the choice of 10 24 is only for practical reasons. There is no corresponding reason for my particular choice of n, one could quite easily modify the definition by requiring that the choice of n be larger.
The formal specification of Ξ is a completely standard (though tedious) exercise using the modern theory of formal mathematical logic; this involves the formal notion of proof defined so that proofs are finite sequences of natural numbers, etc. [12] .
In our universe of sets (¬Ξ) is true and so there is a proof of (¬Ξ) from ZFC 0 . It is not clear just how short such a proof can be. This is a very interesting question.
The witness for Armageddon (though with the end of time comfortably distant in the future) is a proof of (¬Ξ) from ZFC 0 of length less than 10 24 .
It is important to emphasize that while ZFC 0 is a very weak theory, in attempting to prove (¬Ξ) from ZFC 0 , one is free to augment ZFC 0 with the axiom that V n exists where n = |V 1000 |. This theory is not weak, particularly as far as the structure of binary sequences of length 10 24 or even of length 10 10 10 is concerned.
The sum total of human experience in mathematics to date (i. e., the number of manuscript pages written to date) is certainly less than 10 12 pages. The shortest proof from ZFC 0 that no such sequence exists must have length greater than 10 24 . This is arguably beyond the reach of our current experience but there is an important issue which concerns the compression achieved by the informal style in which mathematical arguments are actually written. This is explored a little bit further in [12] .
ogy that a given sequence of length at most 10 24 is a proof of (¬Ξ) from ZFC 0 . But, obviously we do not expect to be able to find a sequence of length less than 10 24 which is a proof of (¬Ξ) from ZFC 0 . This actually gives a prediction about the physical universe since one can code any candidate for such a sequence by a binary sequence of length at most 10 26 . The point is that assuming the validity of the quantum view of the world, it is possible to build an actual physical device which must have a nonzero chance of finding such a sequence if such a sequence can exist. The device simply contains (a suitably large number of independent) modules each of which performs an independent series of measurements which in effect flips a quantum coin. This of course requires something like quantum theory. In the universe as described by Newtonian laws, the argument described above does not apply since truly random processes would not exist. One could imagine proving that for a large class of chaotic (but deterministic) processes ("mechanical coin flippers"), no binary sequence of length 10 24 which actually codes a formal proof, can possibly be generated. In other words, for the non-quantum world, the prediction that no such sequence (as above) can be generated may not require that the conception of V n is meaningful where n = |V 1000 |.
Granting quantum law, and based only on our collective experience in Mathematics to date, how can one account for the prediction (that one cannot find a sequence of length less than 10 24 which is a proof of (¬Ξ) from ZFC 0 ) unless one believes that the conception of V n is meaningful where n = |V 1000 |?
Arguably (given current physical theory) this is already a conception of a nonphysical realm.
Beyond the finite realm
In this section we briefly summarize the basic argument of [15] though here our use of this argument is for a different purpose.
Skeptic's Attack: The mathematical conception of infinity is meaningless and without consequence because the entire conception of the universe of sets is a complete fiction. Further, all the theorems of Set Theory are merely finitistic truths, a reflection of the mathematician and not of any genuine mathematical "reality".
Throughout this section, the "Skeptic" simply refers to the meta-mathematical position which denies any genuine meaning to a conception of uncountable sets. The counterview is that of the "Set Theorist".
The Set Theorist's Response: The development of Set Theory, after
Cohen, has led to the realization there is a robust hierarchy of strong axioms of infinity.
Elaborating further, it has been discovered that in many cases, very different lines of investigation have led to problems whose degree of unsolvability is exactly calibrated by a notion of infinity. Thus the hierarchy of large cardinal axioms emerges an intrinsic, fundamental, conception within Set Theory. To illustrate this I discuss an example from modern Set Theory which concerns infinite games.
Suppose A ⊂ P(N) where P(N) denotes the set of all sets σ ⊆ N and N is the set of all natural numbers; N = {1, 2, . . . , k, . . .}.
Associated to the set A is an infinite game involving two players, Player I and Player II. The players alternate declaring at stage k whether k ∈ σ or k σ:
Stage 1: Player I declares 1 ∈ σ or declares 1 σ;
Stage 2: Player II declares 2 ∈ σ or declares 2 σ;
Stage 3: Player I declares 3 ∈ σ or declares 3 σ; . . .
After infinitely many stages a set σ ⊆ N is specified. Player I wins this run of the game if σ ∈ A; otherwise Player II wins. (Note: Player I has control of which odd numbers are in σ, and Player II has control of which even numbers are in σ.).
A strategy is simply a function which provides moves for the players given just the current state of the game. More formally a strategy is a function
where [N] <ω denotes the set of all finite subsets of N. At each stage k of the game the relevant player can choose to follow τ by declaring "k ∈ σ" if τ(a, k) = 1 and declaring "k σ" if τ(a, k) = 0, where
The strategy τ is a winning strategy for Player I if by following the strategy at each stage k where it is Player I's turn to play (i.e., for all odd k), Player I wins the game no matter how Player II plays. Similarly τ is a winning strategy for Player II if by following the strategy at each stage k where it is Player II's turn to play (i.e., for all even k), Player II wins the game no matter how Player I plays.
The game is determined if there is a winning strategy for one of the players. Clearly it is impossible for there to be winning strategies for both players.
It is easy to specify sets A ⊆ P(N) for which the corresponding game is determined, however, the problem of specifying a set A ⊆ P(N) for which the corresponding game is not determined, turns out to be quite a bit more difficult. The Axiom of Determinacy, AD, is the axiom which asserts that for all sets A ⊆ P(N), the game given by A, as described above, is determined. This axiom was first proposed by Mycielski and Steinhaus, [9] , and contradicts the Axiom of Choice, so the problem here is whether the Axiom of Choice is necessary to construct a set
for which the corresponding game is not determined. Clearly if the Axiom of Choice is necessary then the existence of such set A is quite a subtle fact.
The unsolvability of this problem is exactly calibrated by large cardinal axioms.
The relevant large cardinal notion is that of a Woodin cardinal which I shall not define, [5] . The ZF axioms are the ZFC axioms but without the Axiom of Choice. The issue of whether the Axiom of Choice is needed to construct a counterexample to AD is exactly the question of whether the theory, ZF + AD, is formally consistent.
Theorem 2. The two theories,
(1) ZF + AD (2) ZFC + "There exist infinitely many Woodin cardinals" are equiconsistent.
A prediction and a challenge for the Skeptic
Is the theory, ZF + AD, really formally consistent? The claim that it is consistent is a prediction which can be refuted by finite evidence (a formal contradiction). Taking an admittedly extreme position, I claim in [15] the following.
It is only through the calibration by a large cardinal axiom in conjunction with our understanding of the hierarchy of such axioms as true axioms about the universe of sets, that this prediction; the formal theory ZF+AD is consistent, is justified.
As a consequence of my belief in this claim, I also made a prediction:
In the next 10,000 years there will be no discovery of an inconsistency in this theory.
This is a specific and unambiguous prediction about the physical universe just as is the case for the analogous prediction in the previous section. Further it is a prediction which does not arise by a reduction to a previously held truth (as for example is the case for the prediction that no counterexample to Fermat's Last Theorem will be discovered). This is a genuinely new prediction which I make in [15] based on the development of Set Theory over the last 50 years and on my belief that the conception of the transfinite universe of sets is meaningful. I make this prediction independently of all speculation of what computational devices might be developed in the next 10,000 years (or whatever new sources of knowledge might be discovered) which increase the effectiveness of research in Mathematics.
Now the Skeptic might object that this prediction is not interesting or natural because the formal theories are not interesting or natural. But such objections are not allowed in Physics, the ultimate physical theory should explain all (physical) aspects of the physical universe, not just those which we regard as natural. How can we apply a lessor standard for the ultimate mathematical theory? Of course, I also predict:
There will be no discovery ever of an inconsistency in this theory;
and this prediction, if true, is arguably a physical law. To examine the Skeptic's Retreat and to assess how this too might be refuted I need to briefly survey the basic template for large cardinal axioms in Set Theory.
Large cardinal axioms within Set Theory
A set N is transitive if every element of N is a subset of N. Transitive sets are fragments of V which are analogous to initial segments. For each ordinal α the set V α is a transitive set.
The simplest (proper) class is the class of all ordinals. This class is a transitive class where a class M ⊆ V is defined to be a transitive class if every element of M is a subset of M. The basic template for large cardinal axioms is as follows.
There is a transitive class M and an elementary embedding
which is not the identity.
With the exception of the definition of a Reinhardt cardinal which I shall come to below, one can always assume that the classes, M and j, are classes which are logically definable from parameters by formulas of a fixed bounded level of complexity (Σ 2 -formulas). Moreover the assertion that j is an elementary embedding-that is the assertion:
• For all formulas φ(x) and for all sets a,
-is equivalent to the assertion:
• For all formulas φ(x), for all ordinals α, and for all sets a ∈ V α ,
Therefore this template makes no essential use of the notion of a class. It is simply for convenience that I refer to classes (and this is the usual practice in Set Theory).
Suppose that M is a transitive class and that
is an elementary embedding which not the identity. Suppose that j(α) = α for all ordinals α. Then one can show by transfinite induction that for all ordinals α, the embedding, j, is the identity on V α . Therefore since j is not the identity, there must exist an ordinal α such that j(α) α. The least such ordinal is the critical point of j.
This must be a cardinal. The critical point of j is the large cardinal and the existence of the transitive class M and the elementary embedding j are the witnesses for this.
A cardinal κ is a measurable cardinal if there exists a transitive class M and an elementary embedding,
It is by requiring M to be closer to V that one can define large cardinal axioms far beyond the axiom, "There is a measurable cardinal". In general the closer one requires M to be to V, the stronger the large cardinal axiom. The natural maximum axiom was proposed (M = V) by Reinhardt in his Ph.D thesis, see [10] . The associated large cardinal axiom is that of a Reinhardt cardinal.
Definition 3.
A cardinal κ is a Reinhardt cardinal if there is an elementary embedding,
The definition of a Reinhardt cardinal makes essential use of classes, but the following variation does not and this variation (which is not a standard notion) is only formulated in order to facilitate this discussion. The definition requires a logical notion. Suppose that α and β are ordinals such that α < β. Then
if and only if V β φ[a]. Thus V α ≺ V β if and only if
is an elementary embedding where I is the identity map.
there exists an elementary embedding,
such that κ is the critical point of j. can be refuted without using the Axiom of Choice. The difficulty is that without the Axiom of Choice it is extraordinarily difficult to prove anything about sets.
Kunen's proof leaves open the possibility that the following large cardinal axiom might be consistent with the Axiom of Choice. This therefore is essentially the strongest large cardinal axiom not known to be refuted by the Axiom of Choice, see [5] more on this as well as for the actual statement of Kunen's theorem.
such that κ is the critical point of j.
The issue of whether the existence of a weak Reinhardt cardinal is consistent with the axioms, ZF, is an important issue for the Set Theorist because by the results of [16] , the theory ZF + "There is a weak Reinhardt cardinal"
proves the formal consistency of the theory ZFC + "There is a proper class of strongly (ω + 1)-huge cardinals".
This number theoretic statement is a theorem of Number Theory. But as indicated above, the notion of a strongly (ω + 1)-huge cardinal is essentially the strongest large cardinal notion which is not known to be refuted by the Axiom of Choice.
Therefore the number theoretic assertion that the theory ZF + "There is a weak Reinhardt cardinal" is consistent is a stronger assertion than the number theoretic assertion that the theory ZFC + "There is a proper class of strongly (ω + 1)-huge cardinals" is consistent. More precisely, the former assertion implies, but is not implied by, the latter assertion; unless of course the theory ZFC + "There is a proper class of strongly (ω + 1)-huge cardinals" is formally inconsistent. This raises an interesting question.
How could the Set Theorist ever be able to argue for the prediction that the existence of weak Reinhardt cardinals is consistent with axioms of Set Theory without the Axiom of Choice?
Moreover this one prediction implies all the predictions (of formal consistency) the Set Theorist can currently make based on the entire large cardinal hierarchy as presently conceived (in the context of a universe of sets which satisfies the Axiom of Choice).
My point is that by appealing to the Skeptic's Retreat, one could reasonably claim that the theory ZF + "There is a weak Reinhardt cardinal", is formally consistent and in making this single claim one would subsume all the claims of consistency that the Set Theorist can make based on our current understanding of the universe of sets (without abandoning the Axiom of Choice). The definition of L is simply given by replacing the operation P(X) in the definition of V α+1 by the operation P Def (X) which associates to the set X the set of all subsets
Y ⊆ X such that Y is logically definable in the structure, (X, ∈), from parameters in X.
For any infinite set X, P Def (X) ⊂ P(X) and P Def (X) P(X).
Thus one defines L α by induction on the ordinal α; setting L 0 = ∅, setting
and taking unions at limit stages. The class L is defined as the class of all sets a such that a ∈ L α for some ordinal α. It is perhaps important to note that while there must exist a proper class of ordinals α such that
this is not true for all ordinals α.
Relativizing the definition of L to V ω+1 we obtains the class L(V ω+1 ) which is more customarily denoted by L(R); here one defines,
and proceeds by induction exactly as above to define L α (R) for all ordinals α. The class L(R) is the class of all sets a such that a ∈ L α (R) for some ordinal α.
Unlike the case for L, one cannot prove that the Axiom of Choice holds in L(R), though one can show that all of the other axioms of ZFC hold in L(R). The following theorem which is related to Theorem 2, not only establishes the consistency of ZF+AD from simply the existence of large cardinals, it also establishes that L(R) AD (as a new truth about sets)-see [5] for more on the history of this theorem and the attempts to establish that L(R) AD from large cardinal axioms. experience with the theory, ZF + AD, suggests that as an alternative, one should seek both a generalization of L(R) and some structural principles for this fragment such that the axiom that asserts both the existence of this fragment and that the structural principles hold in this fragment, implies the formal consistency of the axiom which asserts the existence of a weak Reinhardt cardinal, or even better that implies that the latter axiom actually holds in this fragment.
In fact there are compelling candidates for generalizations of L(R) and axioms for these fragments generalizing AD. But at present there is simply no plausible candidate for such a generalization of L(R) in which the axiom that there is a weak Reinhardt cardinal can even hold; nor is there a plausible candidate for a fragment together with structural principles for that fragment which would imply the formal consistency of the existence of a weak Reinhardt cardinal. This is explored more fully in [16] .
There is another potential option which is suggested by a remarkable theorem of Vopenka. But to explain this further I must give another definition which I shall also require in the subsequent discussion. This is the definition of the class, HOD, which originates in remarks of Gödel at the Princeton Bicentennial Conference in December,
1946. The first detailed reference appears to be [7] (see the review of [7] by G. Kreisel).
Definition 8 (ZF).
(1) For each ordinal α, HOD α is the set of all sets a such that there exists a transitive set M ⊂ V α such that a ∈ M and such for all b ∈ M, b is definable in V α from ordinal parameters.
(2) HOD is the class of all sets a such that a ∈ HOD α for some α.
I caution that just as is the case for L α , in general
though for a proper class of ordinals α it is true that HOD α = HOD ∩ V α .
The class HOD is quite interesting for a number of reasons, one of which is illustrated by the following observation of Gödel which as indicated is stated within just the theory ZF, in other words without assuming the Axiom of Choice. The alternative conception of truth for Set Theory which is suggested by this theorem and which could provide a basis for the claim that weak Reinhardt cardinals are consistent is the subject of the next section.
The generic-multiverse of sets
The challenge presented in the previous section-the challenge to account for the prediction that the existence of a weak Reinhardt cardinal is formally consistent with ZF axioms-suggests that one should consider a multiverse conception of the universe of sets. The point of course is that while the existence of a weak Reinhardt cardinal is not possible, granting the Axiom of Choice, this does not rule out that there may be (symmetric) generic extensions of V in which there are weak Reinhardt cardinals. Such a multiverse approach to the conception of the universe of sets would also mitigate the difficulties associated to the formal unsolvability of fundamental problems such as that of the Continum Hypothesis, and this latter feature is the primary motivation for such an approach. This section is based on [13] .
Let the multiverse (of sets) refer to the collection of possible universes of sets.
The truths of the Set Theory according to the multiverse conception of truth are the sentences which hold in each universe of the multiverse. Cohen's method of forcing which is the fundamental technique for constructing non-trivial extensions of a given (countable) model of ZFC suggests a natural candidate for a multiverse; the genericmultiverse is generated from each universe of the collection by closing under generic extensions (enlargements) and under generic refinements (inner models of a universe which the given universe is a generic extension of). To illustrate the concept of the generic-multiverse, suppose that M is a countable transitive set with the property that M ZFC.
Let V M be the smallest set of countable transitive sets such that M ∈ V M and such that for all pairs, (M 1 , M 2 ), of countable transitive sets such that
and such that M 2 is a generic extension of
where V N is defined using N in place of M. V M is the generic-multiverse generated in
The generic-multiverse conception of truth is the position that a sentence is true if and only if it holds in each universe of the generic-multiverse generated by V. This can be formalized within V in the sense that for each sentence φ there is a sentence φ * , recursively depending on φ, such that φ is true in each universe of the genericmultiverse generated by V if and only if φ * is true in V. The sentence φ * is explicit given φ and does not depend on V. For exmple, given any countable transitive set, M,
M φ * if and only if N φ for all N ∈ V M (the proof is given in [14] ). This is an important point in favor of the generic-multiverse position since it shows that as far as assessing truth is concerned, the generic-multiverse position is not that sensitive to the metauniverse in which the generic-multiverse is being defined.
Is the generic-multiverse position a reasonable one? The refinements of Cohen's method of forcing in the decades since his initial discovery of the method and the resulting plethora of problems shown to be unsolvable, have in a practical sense almost compelled one to adopt the generic-multiverse position. This has been reinforced by some rather unexpected consequences of large cardinal axioms which I shall discuss later in this section.
The purpose of this section is not to argue against any possible multiverse position but to more carefully examine the generic-multiverse position within the context of modern Set Theory. In brief I shall argue that modulo the Ω Conjecture (which I shall define in the next section), the generic-multiverse position outlined above is not plausible. The essence of the argument against the generic-multiverse position is that assuming the Ω Conjecture is true (and that there is a proper class of Woodin cardinals) then this position is simply a brand of formalism that denies the transfinite by a reducing truth about the universe of sets to truth about a simple fragment such as the integers or, in this case, the sets of real numbers. The Ω Conjecture is invariant between V and any generic extension of V and so the generic-multiverse position must either declare the Ω Conjecture to be true or declare the Ω Conjecture to be false.
It is a fairly common (informal) claim that the quest for truth about the universe of sets is analogous to the quest for truth about the physical universe. However I am claiming an important distinction. While physicists would rejoice in the discovery that the conception of the physical universe reduces to the conception of some simple fragment or model, the set theorist rejects this possibility. I claim that by the very nature of its conception, the set of all truths of the transfinite universe (the universe of sets) cannot be reduced to the set of truths of some explicit fragment of the universe of sets. Taking into account the iterative conception of sets, the set of all truths of an explicit fragment of the universe of sets cannot be reduced to the truths of an explicit simpler fragment. The latter is the basic position on which I shall base my arguments.
An assertion is Π 2 if it is of the form, " For every infinite ordinal α , V α φ ", for some sentence, φ. A Π 2 assertion is a multiverse truth if the Π 2 assertion holds in each universe of the multiverse. A key point:
Remark 11. Arguably, the generic-multiverse view of truth is only viable for Π 2 -sentences and not in general even for Σ 2 -sentences (these are sentences expressible as the negation of a Π 2 -sentence). This is because of the restriction to set forcing in the definition of the generic-multiverse. Therefore one can quite reasonably question whether the generic-multiverse view can possibly account for the predictions of consistency given by large cardinal axioms. At present there is no reasonable candidate for the definition of an expanded version of the generic-multiverse which allows class forcing extensions and yet which preserves the existence of large cardinals across the multiverse.
In the context where there is a Woodin cardinal, let us use "δ 0 " to denote the least Woodin cardinal. So I am just fixing a notation just as "ω 1 " is fixed as the notation for the least uncountable ordinal. Both ω 1 and δ 0 can change in passing from one universe of sets to an extension of that universe.
The assertion, "δ is a Woodin cardinal" is equivalent to the assertion, V δ+1 "δ is a Woodin cardinal"
and so δ = δ 0 if and only if
Therefore assuming there is a Woodin cardinal, for each sentence φ, it is a Π 2 assertion to say that
and it is a Π 2 assertion to say that V δ 0 +1 φ. Thus in any one universe of the multiverse, the set of all sentences φ such that V δ 0 +1 φ-that is, the theory of V δ 0 +1 as computed in that in that universe-is recursive in the set of Π 2 sentences (assertions) which hold in that universe. Further by Tarski's Theorem on the undefinability of truth the latter set cannot be recursive in the former set.
These comments suggest the following multiverse laws which I state in reference to an arbitrary multiverse position (though assuming that the existence of a Woodin cardinal holds throughout the multiverse).
First Multiverse Law
The set of Π 2 assertions which are multiverse truths is not recursive in the set of multiverse truths of V δ 0 +1 .
The motivation for this multiverse law is that if the set of Π 2 multiverse truths is recursive in the set of multiverse truths of V δ 0 +1 then as far as evaluating Π 2 assertions is concerned, the multiverse is equivalent to the reduced multiverse of just the fragments A set Y ⊂ V ω is definable in V δ 0 +1 across the multiverse if the set Y is definable in the structure V δ 0 +1 of each universe of the multiverse (possibly by formulas which depend on the parent universe). The second multiverse law is a variation of the First Multiverse Law.
Second Multiverse Law
The set of Π 2 assertions which are multiverse truths, is not definable in V δ 0 +1 across the multiverse.
Again, by Tarski's Theorem on the undefinability of truth, this multiverse law is obviously a reasonable one if one regards the only possibility for the multiverse to be the universe of sets so that set of multiverse truths of V δ 0 +1 is simply the set of all sentences which are true in V δ 0 +1 and the set of Π 2 assertions which are multiverse truths is simply the set of Π 2 assertions which are true in V. Likewise the Second Multiverse Law would have to hold if one modified the law to simply require that the set of Π 2 assertions which are multiverse truths, is not uniformly definable in V δ 0 +1 across the multiverse (i.e., by a single formula).
Assuming both that Ω Conjecture and the existence of a proper class of Woodin cardinals hold in each (or one) universe of the generic-multiverse generated by V, There is a special case which I can present without any additional definitions and which is not contingent on any conjectures.
Theorem 12.
Suppose that M is a countable transitive set M ZFC + "There is a proper class of Woodin cardinals"
and that M ∩ Ord is as small as possible. Then V M violates both multiverse laws.
Ω-logic
The generic-multiverse conception of truth declares the Continum Hypothesis to be neither true nor false and declares, granting large cardinals, that assertion, If there is a proper class of Woodin cardinals then the relation T Ω φ, is generically absolute. This fact which arguably was a completely unanticipated consequence of large cardinals, makes Ω-logic interesting from a meta-mathematical point of view.
For example the set
is generically absolute in the sense that for a given sentence, φ, the question whether or not φ is logically Ω-valid; i.e., whether or not φ ∈ V Ω , is absolute between V and all of its generic extensions. In particular the method of forcing cannot be used to show the formal independence of assertions of the form ∅ Ω φ. (1) φ is holds across the generic-multiverse;
(2) "∅ Ω φ" holds across the generic-multiverse; (3) "∅ Ω φ" holds in at least one universe of the generic-multiverse.
For any Σ 2 -sentence φ, the assertion, "∅ Ω (¬φ)", is by the definitions equivalent to the assertion that for some complete Boolean algebra, B, V B φ. Therefore assuming that there exists a proper class of Woodin cardinals, for any Σ 2 -sentence, if in one universe of the generic-multiverse generated by V, the sentence φ is true, then in every universe of the generic-multiverse generated by V, the sentence φ can be forced to be true by passing to a generic extension of that universe. This same remarkable fact applies to symmetric forcing extensions as well.
Therefore assuming there is a proper class of Woodin cardinals, it seems that the generic-multiverse view of truth can account for the prediction that weak Reinhardt cardinals are consistent with ZF; the relevant Σ 2 -sentence is the sentence which asserts that there exists a complete Boolean algebra B and there exists a term τ ∈ V B for a transitive set such that (with Boolean value 1), V(τ) ZF + "There is a weak Reinhardt cardinal".
This sentence if true in one universe of the generic-multiverse generated by V must be true in every universe of the generic-multiverse generated by V. Further by Theorem 10, if there is a weak Reinhardt cardinal then in the generic-multiverse generated by HOD this Σ 2 -sentence is actually declared as true.
But on close inspection one realizes this is not really a justification at all. The sentence above is meaningful in the generic-multiverse view of truth but there is no explanation of why it is true. This is exactly as is the case for the sentence which asserts that the formal theory, ZF + "There is a weak Reinhardt cardinal.", is consistent.
To more fully evaluate the generic-multiverse position one must understand the logical relation, T Ω φ. In particular a natural question arises: is there a corresponding proof relation?
1.4.2
The Ω Conjecture I define the proof relation, T Ω φ. This requires a preliminary notion that a set of reals be universally Baire, [1] . In fact I shall define T Ω φ, assuming the existence of a proper class of Woodin cardinals and exploiting the fact that there are a number of (equivalent) definitions. Without the assumption that there is a proper class of Woodin cardinals, the definition is a bit more technical, [13] . Recall that if S is a compact
Hausdorff space then a set X ⊆ S has the property of Baire in the space S if there exists an open set O ⊆ S such that symmetric difference,
is meager in S (contained in a countable union of closed sets with empty interior). I now come to the Ω Conjecture which in essence is simply the conjecture that the Gödel Completeness Theorem holds for Ω-logic; see [13] for a more detailed discus- can be found in [14] . The example of Theorem 12 violates both weak multiverse laws. Then the multiverse view of truth given by V * Finally, there is no compelling candidate for a multiverse view of truth based on a multiverse generated by V which is smaller than the generic-multiverse; other than the multiverse which just contains V. But there certainly are candidates. For example, restricting the generic-multiverse to the multiverse generated by only allowing forcing notions which are homogeneous could (as far as I know) give a multiverse view which does not violate the multiverse laws. Further given one motivation I cited for a genericmultiverse view (based on Theorem 10), such a restriction is a natural one.
The infinite realm
At this point, I just do not see any argument for such a restricted multiverse view.
The fundamental problem with a multiverse view based on a multiverse which is smaller than the generic-multiverse is that there must exist Π 2 sentences which are declared to be true and which are not true in the generic-multiverse view. At present there is simply no natural candidate for such a collection of Π 2 sentences which is not simply the set of all Π 2 sentences true in V.
The determined advocate for the generic-multiverse conception of truth might simply accept the failure of the multiverse laws as a deep fact about truth in Set Theory, and seek salvation in the multiverse truths which are beyond Π 2 sentences. But then this advocate must either explain the restriction to set forcing extensions in the definition of the generic-multiverse or specify exactly how the multiverse is to be defined.
Restricting to set generic extensions resurrects the specter of unsolvable problems. For example consider the question of whether there exists a cardinal λ such that the Generalized Continuum Hypothesis holds for all cardinals above λ. The answer to this question is invariant across the generic-multiverse. Alternatively, specifying the class forcing extensions which are to be allowed seems utterly hopeless at the present time if the corresponding multiverse conception of truth is to declare the question above to be meaningless and yet preserve large axioms as meaningful. Further there is the issue of whether truth in this expanded generic-multiverse is reducible to truth in the universes of that multiverse as is the case of the generic-multiverse.
Of course one could just conclude from all of this that the Ω Conjecture is false and predict that the solution to specifying the true generic-multiverse will be revealed by the nature of the failure of the Ω Conjecture. But the Ω Conjecture is invariant across the generic-multiverse. Thus it is not unreasonable to expect both that the Ω Conjecture has an answer and further if that answer is that it is false, then the Ω Conjecture be refuted from some large cardinal hypothesis. Many of the meta-mathematical consequences of the Ω Conjecture follow from the nontrivial Ω-satisfiability of the Ω Conjecture; this is the assertion that for some universe V * of the generic-multiverse generated by V, there exists an ordinal α such that V This assertion is itself a Σ 2 -assertion and so assuming there is a proper class of Woodin cardinals, this assertion must also be invariant across the generic-multiverse generated by V. While the claim that if the Ω Conjecture is false, then the Ω Conjecture must be refuted from some large cardinal hypothesis, is debatable, the corresponding claim for the nontrivial Ω-satisfiability of the Ω Conjecture (in the sense just defined) is much harder to argue against. The point here is that while there are many examples of sentences which are provably absolute for set forcing and which cannot be decided by any large cardinal axiom, there are no known examples where the sentence is Σ 2 .
In fact if the Ω Conjecture is true then there really can be no such example. Finally it seems unlikely that there is a large cardinal axiom which proves the nontrivial Ω-satisfiability of the Ω Conjecture and yet there be no large cardinal axiom which proves the Ω Conjecture.
Probing the universe of sets; the Inner Model Program
The Inner Model Program is the detailed study of large cardinal axioms. The first construction of an inner model is due to Gödel, [2] and [3] . This construction founded the Inner Model Program, the transitive class constructed is denoted by L and I have given the definition. The question of whether V = L is an important one for Set Theory.
The answer has profound implications for the conception of the universe of sets.
Theorem 25 (Scott, [11] ). Suppose there is a measurable cardinal. Then V L.
The Axiom of Constructibility is the axiom which asserts, "V = L"; more precisely this is the axiom which asserts that for each set a there exists an ordinal α such that a ∈ L α . Scott's theorem provided the first indication that the Axiom of Constructibility is independent of the ZFC axioms. Thus it would seem that the Skeptic's Retreat is in fact a powerful counter-attack.
But there is something wrong here and the answer lies in understanding large cardinal axioms which are much stronger than those within reach of the current hierarchy of inner models.
Supercompact cardinals and beyond
Paraphrasing a standard definition: an extender is an elementary embedding
where M is a transitive class such that M ZFC. Necessarily α ≤ β and E(α) = β. It is not difficult to show that if for all ordinals ξ ≤ α, E(ξ) = ξ then for all a ∈ V α+1 , E(a) = a. Thus if E is non-trivial there must exist an ordinal γ ≤ α such that E(γ) γ and the least such ordinal γ is the critical point of E and is denoted CRT(E).
Extenders are the building blocks for the Inner Model Program which seeks enlargements of L which are transitive classes N such that N contains enough extenders to witness that the targeted large cardinal axiom holds in N. The complication is in specifying just which extenders are to be included in N.
The definition of a supercompact cardinal is due to Reinhardt and Solovay-see [5] for more on the history of the axiom. Below is a reformulation of the definition due to Magidor in terms of extenders.
Definition 26. A cardinal δ is a supercompact cardinal if for each ordinal β > δ there exists an extender
such that E(κ) = δ where κ = CRT(E).
Slightly stronger is the notion that δ is an extendible cardinal: for all α > δ there exists an extender,
such that CRT(E) = δ.
As I have already indicated, the strongest large cardinal axioms not known to be inconsistent with the Axiom of Choice are the family of axioms asserting the existence of strongly (ω + 1)-huge cardinals. These axioms have seemed so far beyond any conceivable inner model theory that they simply are not understood.
The possibilities for an inner model theory at the level of supercompact cardinals and beyond, has been essentially a complete mystery until recently. The reason lies in the nature of extenders. Again for expository purposes, let me define an extender
to be a suitable extender if E(CRT(E)) > α. Thus an extender
is a suitable extender if it is not too long and if V β+1 ⊂ M. For example suppose that κ is a strongly (ω + 1)-huge cardinal as defined in Definition 6 on page 13. Then there exists there exist γ > λ > κ such that
Thus j is an extender but j is not a suitable extender. In particular the existence of a strongly (ω + 1)-huge cardinal cannot be witnessed by a suitable extender. For the construction of the Mitchell-Steel models there is a fundamental requirement that the extenders on sequence from which the enlargement of L is constructed be derived from extenders
Following this basic methodology the enlargements of L at the level of supercompact cardinals and beyond must be constructed from extender sequences which now include extenders which are restrictions of extenders of the form,
and Steel has shown that the basic methodology of analyzing extender models encounters serious obstructions once there are such extenders on the sequence, particularly if the extenders are not suitable.
But by some fairly recent theorems something completely unexpected and remarkable happens. Suppose that N is a transitive class, for some cardinal δ, N "δ is a supercompact cardinal", and that this is witnessed by class of all E|N such that E|N ∈ N and such that E is a suitable extender. Then the transitive class N is close to V and N inherits essentially all large cardinals from V. The amazing thing is that this must happen no matter how N is constructed. This would seem to undermine my earlier claim that inner models should be constructed from extender sequences which contain enough extenders to witness that the targeted large cardinal axiom holds in the inner model. It does not and the reason is that by simply requiring that E|N ∈ N for enough suitable extenders from V to witness that the large cardinal axiom, "There is a supercompact cardinal", holds in N, one (and this is the surprise) necessarily must have E|N ∈ N for a much larger class of extenders, E : V α+1 → V β+1 . So the principle that there are enough extenders in N to witness the targeted large cardinal axiom holds in N is preserved (as it must be). The change, in the case that N is constructed from a sequence of extenders which includes restrictions of suitable extenders, is that these extenders do not have to be on the sequence from which N is constructed. In particular in this case, large cardinal axioms can be witnessed to hold in N by "phantom" extenders, these are extenders of N which are not on the sequence, which cannot be witnessed to hold by any extender on the sequence. This includes large cardinal axioms at the level of strongly (ω + 1)-huge cardinals. As a consequence of this, one can completely avoid the cited obstacles because: One does not need to have the kinds of extenders on the sequence which give rise to the obstacles. Specifically, one can restrict consideration to extender sequences of just extenders derived from suitable extenders and this is a paradigm shift in the whole conception of inner models.
The analysis yields still more. Suppose that there is a positive solution (in ZFC) to the inner model problem for just one supercompact cardinal. Then as a corollary one would would obtain a proof of the following conjecture.
Conjecture (ZF) There are no weak Reinhardt cardinals.
Suppose this conjecture is actually true and it is proved according to the scenario that I have just described. This would in a convincing fashion refute the Skeptic's
Retreat providing for the first time an example of a natural large cardinal axiom proved to be inconsistent as a result of a deep structural analysis.
In fact, it is possible to isolate a specific conjecture which must be true if there is a positive solution to the inner model problem for one supercompact cardinal and which itself suffices for this inconsistency result. This conjecture (which is the HOD Conjecture of [16] ) concerns HOD and we refer the interested (and dedicated) reader to [16] for details. Actually a corollary of the HOD Conjecture suffices to prove the inconsistency conjectured above and this corollary we can easily state. First, a cardinal κ is a regular cardinal if every subset X ⊂ κ with |X| < κ, is bounded in κ. all known large cardinals. The ramifications are discussed at length in [16] . In brief further progress in understanding (and even discovering) large cardinal axioms would have to depend on structural considerations of "ultimate L".
Conclusions
The development of the mathematical theory of infinity has led to a number of specific predictions. These predictions assert that certain technical axioms concerning the existence of large cardinals, are not formally inconsistent with the axioms of set theory. As I have indicated these predications are actually predications about the physical universe. To date there is no known (and credible) explanation for these predictions except that they are true because the corresponding axioms are true in the universe of sets. As the arguments of the first section indicate, these same issues arise even for the conception of large finite sets.
As discussed in the second section, there is a serious challenge to this claim, even ignoring the often cited challenge; the ubiquity of unsolvable problems in Set Theory.
The challenge arises from the fact that here are formal axioms of infinity which are arguably a serious foundational issue for Set Theory for two reasons. First, these axioms are known to refute the Axiom of Choice and second, these axioms are known to be "stronger" than essentially all the notions of infinity believed to be formally consistent with the Axiom of Choice. Here the metric for strength is simply the inference relation for the corresponding predictions (of formal consistency). The issues raised by this are twofold. First (regarding the debate between the Set Theorist and the Skeptic), there is no need to explain the success of a single prediction, it is a succession of ever stronger successful predictions which demands explanation. But this one prediction of consistency subsumes all the predictions made to date and so there is no series of predictions which requires explanation. Second, for the Set Theorist to account for this one prediction it would seem that a different conception of the Universe of Sets is required.
The conception of a Universe of Sets in which the Axiom of Choice fails creates more difficulties than it solves and so this does not seem to be a viable option. However any large cardinal axiom (which is expressible by a Σ 2 -sentence) which can hold in a universe of sets satisfying all of the axioms except for the Axiom of Choice, can hold in a generic extension of a universe of sets which does satisfy the Axiom of Choice.
Therefore this challenge, and the challenge posed by formally unsolvable problems such as that of the Continuum Hypothesis, might both be addressed (but perhaps not completely in a satisfactory manner) by adopting the conception of a multiverse of sets.
that the multiverse laws of Section 3 be satisfied). Therefore if the multiverse view is correct, the Ω Conjecture must be false. Cohen's method. This axiom will not be unique but there is the very real possibility that among these axioms, there is an optimal one (from structural and philosophical considerations). In which case we will have returned, against all odds or reasonable expectation, to the view of truth for Set Theory which was present at the time when the investigation of Set Theory began.
